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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this article is to identify the main principles governing the interpretation of 
domestic law clauses that grant jurisdiction to ICSID arbitration and to analyse the meaning 
of such provisions in the context of the SPP v. Egypt case as the first case on the issue. The 
article first examines the peculiarities of consent to ICSID jurisdiction by way of national 
legislation. In the first part the analysis of the practice of arbitral tribunals in which a claim 
was introduced on the basis of consent to arbitration in domestic law shows that specific 
language of national legislation on consent to arbitration varies considerably. Therefore, 
since consent is the “cornerstone” of the Centre’s jurisdiction, arbitral tribunals recognize 
that not all references to ICSID arbitration in national legislation amount to consent. They 
approach the task of ascertaining the existence of such consent with great care. In the 
second part, the article focuses on the SPP v. Egypt case on the issue and analyses 
challenges that the tribunal met in interpreting relevant national clauses and establishing the 
consent to arbitration. Finally, this article discusses the legacy of interpretation standard of 
SPP v. Egypt case in context of the dissenting opinion and further case law. It is argued that 
the rules of interpretation of domestic law clauses that grant jurisdiction to ICSID arbitration 
are conditioned by the sui generis nature of consent to arbitration as unilateral declarations 
capable of giving rise to international legal obligations. Therefore, for the purpose of 
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establishing whether there is consent to arbitration provided in national legislation, 
international tribunals reasonably take a balanced approach and use the methodological mix 
of rules of interpretation involving various sources: the VCLT, customary law principles 
governing unilateral declarations and domestic legislation. Additionally, this article provides 
suggestions on the possible role of the Guiding Principles applicable to unilateral declarations 
of states capable of creating legal obligations (Guiding principles) in interpreting domestic 
provisions containing an offer to arbitrate before ICSID. 
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The state’s consent to arbitration before the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) included in its national legislation is 
considered one of the standards of protection for investors granted by states in 
their domestic laws. 
Today domestic laws have been largely overtaken by BIT’s as the preferential 
legal mechanism for the protection of foreign investment. However, the possibility 
to establish consent to arbitration through domestic investment legislation is 
recognised as one of the possible ways to consent to arbitration under ICSID 
convention and still some jurisdictions include references to ICSID convention in 
their respective national investment laws.1 
Taking into account that those national laws raise their own legal issues as far 
as the consent provided in the domestic laws is considered a unilateral act by the 
state which can not be interpreted in the same way as investment treaties, it is 
necessary to examine what the specific ways to interpret such national provisions 
are. 
The practice of arbitral tribunals in which a claim was introduced on the basis 
of consent to arbitration in domestic law shows that specific language of national 
legislation on consent to arbitration varies considerably.2 There is not unified 
opinion on how such clauses should be interpreted in academic articles too.3 Since 
consent is the “cornerstone” of the Centre’s jurisdiction, arbitral tribunals recognize 
that not all references to ICSID arbitration in national legislation amount to 
consent. They approach the task of ascertaining the existence of such consent with 
great care. 
                                           
1 See, for example, El Salvador’s Foreign Investment Law, which was in detailed examined by the ICSID 
tribunals in Zhinvali Development Ltd v. Republic of Georgia and in Inceysa Vallisoletana v. El Salvador 
cases; Article 8(2) of the Albania’s Foreign Investment Law of 1993, examined by the tribunal in Tradex 
Hellas v. Albania case; Article 16 of Georgia’s Investment Law, examined in Zhinvali Development Ltd v. 
Republic of Georgia case; Article 22 of Venezuela’s Foreign Investment Law, examined in CEMEX v. 
Venezuela and Mobil v. Venezuela cases, etc. 
2 See, for example, Rumeli Telekom AS and Telsim Mobil Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri AS v. Republic of 
Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award (July 29, 2008); Tradex Hellas (Greece) v. Albania, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/94/2, Decision on Jurisdiction (December 24, 1996); Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award (July 24, 2008); Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd (SPP) 
v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3; Zhinvali Development Ltd v. Republic of Georgia, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/00/1, Award (January 24, 2003); Mobil Corp. and others v. Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction (June 10, 2010); CEMEX Caracas 
Investments BV and CEMEX Caracas II Investments BV v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/08/15, Decision on Jurisdiction (December 30, 2010); etc. 
3 See, for example, Yulia Andreeva, “Consent to Arbitration as a Unilateral Act of State: In Search for a 
Non-Conventional Approach Towards Treaty Interpretation”; in: Todd Weiler, ed., Investment Treaty 
Arbitration and International Law, Vol. 3 (JurisNet LLC, 2010); David Caron, “The Interpretation of 
National Foreign Investment Laws as Unilateral Acts Under International Law”; in: Mahnoush Arsanjani 
and Jacob Katz Cogan, eds., Looking to the Future: Essays on International Law in Honor of W. Michael 
Reisman (Robert Sloane & Siegfried Weissner, 2011); Michele Potesta, “The Interpretation of Consent to 
ICSID Arbitration Contained in Domestic Investment Laws,” Arbitration International 27 (2011). 
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Thus, the aim of this article is to identify the main principles governing the 
interpretation of domestic law clauses that grant jurisdiction to ICSID arbitration 
provided in academic papers and arbitration as well to analyse the application of 
such principles in particular in context of the SPP v. Egypt case as the first and 
leading case on the issue. 
The article first examines the peculiarities of consent to ICSID jurisdiction by 
way of national legislation. In second part, it focuses on the SPP v. Egypt case on 
the issue and analyses challenges that the tribunal met in interpreting relevant 
national clauses and establishing the consent to arbitration. Finally, this article 
discusses the legacy of interpretation standard of SPP v. Egypt case in context of 
the dissenting opinion and further case law. Besides, it provides suggestions on the 
possible role of the Guiding Principles applicable to unilateral declarations of states 
capable of creating legal obligations (Guiding principles)4 in interpreting domestic 
provisions containing an offer to arbitrate before ICSID. 
1. SCOPE OF CONSENT TO ARBITRATION IN NATIONAL LEGISLATION 
Consent to ICSID jurisdiction may be given in different ways. One option is as 
a provision in the host state’s national legislation offering ICSID arbitration to 
foreign investors. 
Some national legislation laws contain unequivocal provisions for dispute 
settlement by ICSID.5 Some provide reference to ICSID as one of several possible 
means of dispute settlement. There are also jurisdictions that require a specific 
agreement between the host state and the investor contained in an investment 
agreement, an investment license or another document.6 
The most problematic are cases in the so-called “gray area”: with national 
provisions that are less clear and may raise serious doubts whether or not the state 
has expressed its consent to arbitration. Cases that fall under this “gray area” may 
include legislation by which the host country’s legislator simply informs possible 
foreign investors that the state is a party to the ICSID convention. There may be 
national provisions providing that the “foreign investor “shall be entitled to request 
that the dispute be finally settled by one of several methods including the ICSID 
                                           
4 Guiding Principles Applicable to Unilateral Declarations of States Capable of Creating Legal Obligations, 
United Nations, International Law Commission, Report of the 58th Session, UN Doc. A/61/10 (2006) // 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_9_2006.pdf (accessed June 30, 
2014). 
5 For example, Article 8(2) of Albania’s Foreign Investment Law in Tradex Hellas (Greece) v. Albania, 
supra note 2, 186–187. 
6 In Tradex Hellas (Greece) v. Albania case tribunal found that Albania had ‘unambiguously’ consented to 
the jurisdiction of the Centre by way of that legislative provision (ibid., 171–178). 
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convention, or that the dispute “shall be settled” by one of these different 
methods.”7 
Those ambiguous provisions require careful analysis and precise 
interpretation. In order to identify possible rules of interpretation for solving 
difficulties that arise, in the following part of this article the examination of the first 
famous SPP v. Egypt8 case will be provided and further developments on the 
interpretation of national legislation will be discussed. 
2. INTERPRETATION OF INVESTMENT PROVISIONS IN NATIONAL 
LEGISLATION: SPP V. EGYPT CASE STUDY 
2.1. THE RELEVANT FACTS OF THE CASE 
In 1974, Southern Pacific Properties (SPP), a Hong Kong company, entered 
into agreements with Egypt to establish a joint venture (ETDC) with a purpose to 
develop an international tourist complex at the Pyramids Oasis in Egypt. The 
dispute originated in 1978 when, as a result of parliamentary opposition, Egypt 
cancelled the project placing ETDC in judicial trusteeship. 
Pursuant to the contractual arbitration clause, SPP commenced ICC 
arbitration, and obtained an award in damages. The Paris Court of Appeal annulled 
the ICC award on the ground that Egypt was not a party to the investment 
agreement. The latter decision was referred to the French Court of Cassation. 
In 1984 SPP filed a request for arbitration at ICSID, asking for relief in the 
same matter. That arbitration was initiated pursuant to the Egyptian Law No. 43 
Article 8 which provided for the settlement of disputes in accordance with the 
agreement of the parties, or failing such agreement, with the provisions of bilateral 
investment treaties, or in their absence under the ICSID convention.9 
According to SPP, this reference to ICSID arbitration constituted Egypt's 
consent to have recourse to this method of dispute settlement. Egypt argued that 
such a provision in national law was not a sufficient basis for the Centre’s 
jurisdiction. Egypt countered that the reference was merely illustrative of several 
dispute resolution alternatives, the selection of which required further agreement 
between the parties. The tribunal dealt with the objections to the jurisdiction of 
ICSID in two decisions. 
                                           
7 Andrea Marco Steingruber, Consent in International Arbitration (Oxford: OUP, 2012), p. 200. 
8 Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd (SPP) v. Arab Republic of Egypt case, supra note 2, 
Decision on Jurisdiction (27 April 1985), 3 ICSID Rep. 112 (“Decision on Jurisdiction I”), and Decision on 
Jurisdiction (14 April 1988), ibid 131 (“Decision on Jurisdiction II”). 
9 See for full text of Article 8 in Annexture. 
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By its first decision on jurisdiction, dated 27 November 1985, the tribunal 
decided to stay the proceeding until the French courts finally resolved the question 
of whether the parties agreed to submit their dispute to the jurisdiction of ICC. In 
1987 the French Court of Cassation finally upheld the decision of the Court of 
Appeal. After this, the ICSID tribunal carefully analysed Article 8 of Egypt’s Foreign 
Investment Law and on April 14, 1988 decided to uphold its jurisdiction. In 1989, a 
new Egyptian Law on investments was adopted which established a provision 
requiring specific additional agreement of the parties for ICSID arbitration. 
The dispute ended with the tribunal’s decision in 1992, in which Egypt was 
held liable to pay equitable compensation for the value of the expropriated 
investment. 
2.2. CHALLENGES THE TRIBUNAL HAD TO FACE IN INTERPRETING 
NATIONAL LAW 
2.2.1. APPLICABLE LAW 
The first matter with which the tribunal dealt in SPP v. Egypt case was the 
applicable law to the consent to arbitration provided for in the national legislation. 
The tribunal recognised that consent to arbitration should be treated as a unilateral 
declaration capable of giving rise to an international legal obligation. It decided that 
the issue in this case was “whether certain unilaterally enacted legislation has 
created an international obligation under a multilateral treaty”.10 
The tribunal decided that the interpretation of the host state of its legislation 
is to be given considerable weight, but it cannot control the tribunal’s decision as to 
its own competence. Taking into account that Law No. 43 is not the result of 
negotiations between two or more states, but rather the result of unilateral act by a 
single state, the tribunal stated that “to the extent that Article 8 is alleged to be a 
universal declaration of acceptance of the Centre’s jurisdiction, subject to reciprocal 
acceptance by a national of another contracting state, the tribunal must also 
consider certain aspects of international law governing unilateral juridical acts.”11 
The tribunal concluded that the applicable law by which it shall determine 
whether national statute provided for consent to ICSID jurisdiction would be 
“general principles of statutory interpretation taking into consideration, where 
appropriate, relevant rules of treaty interpretations and principles of international 
law applicable to unilateral declarations”.12 
                                           
10 Ibid., para 61. 
11 Ibid., para 61. 
12 Ibid., para 60. 
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2.2.2. RULES OF INTERPRETATION PROVIDED BY THE TRIBUNAL IN 
FINDING CONSENT TO ARBITRATION 
The second issue for the tribunal was whether the provision referring to ICSID 
in national legislation was capable of constituting consent to jurisdiction. Firstly, the 
tribunal recognized that the starting point in statutory interpretation shall be the 
ordinary or grammatical meaning of the terms used. Secondly, the tribunal decided 
that “jurisdictional instruments are to be interpreted neither restrictively nor 
expansively, but rather objectively and in good faith, and jurisdiction will be found 
to exist if—but only if—the force of the arguments militating in its favour is 
preponderant.”13 At this stage, the tribunal concentrated on a detailed grammatical 
analysis of relevant text, including Arabic original, and tried to find whether the 
reference to ICSID jurisdiction is formulated in mandatory terms or, on the 
contrary, subject to a further manifestation of will by the state. 
In this respect, the tribunal took into consideration the particular usage of the 
verb phrase “shall be settled” as opposed to “may be”. The tribunal found that the 
ordinary grammatical meaning of the words “shall be settled” was mandatory on its 
face, and it was undisputed that the Arabic word from which it was translated 
meant “shall be/will be”. The tribunal relied on the dictum of the ICJ14 and 
concluded that such expression mandated the submission of disputes to the various 
methods prescribed therein (as opposed to making them purely optional and 
subject to a further consent by the state).15 
Thirdly, the tribunal rejected Egypt’s contention that national legislation 
required the execution of a separate agreement to establish consent to Centre’s 
jurisdiction. In the tribunal’s opinion, such a requirement would “destroy the 
internal logic of art 8 and render much of that provision superfluous”.16 The tribunal 
also rejected the idea that Article 8 had the consequence only of informing potential 
investors of Egypt’s willingness to negotiate a consent agreement. 
Fourthly, with respect to the question of priority among the various methods 
of dispute settlement, the tribunal found that there was a hierarchical relationship 
indicated by a movement from the more specific to the more general. It concluded 
that Article 8 constitutes an express “consent in writing” to ICSID jurisdiction “in 
those cases where there is no other agreed-upon method of dispute settlement and 
no applicable bilateral treaty.”17 
                                           
13 Ibid., para 63. 
14 Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative 
Organization, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep 150 [1960] (June 8, 1960), 159. 
15 Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd (SPP) v. Arab Republic of Egypt case, supra note 8, paras 
74–82. 
16 Ibid., para 94. 
17 Ibid., para 116. 
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Since the parties had not agreed on another method of dispute resolution and 
since there was no applicable bilateral treaty in force, the tribunal found “that 
Article 8 of Law No. 43 operates to confer jurisdiction upon the Centre with respect 
to the Parties’ dispute.”18 
3. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS AND THE LEGACY OF THE 
INTERPRETATION STANDARD OF THE SPP CASE 
In its dissenting opinion in SPP v. Egypt case, Judge Dr El Mahdi argued that 
since an investment law is part of the legislation of a state, a clause included 
therein should be construed in light of the interpretative principles of that state.19 
As to the interpretation of a text of a national law, Judge Dr El Mahdi emphasised 
that the interpretation of a national provision must be undertaken on the basis of 
the original text of the law. The judge sated that the tribunal in the SPP case based 
its decision concerning jurisdiction upon erroneous translation. In the judge’s 
opinion, reference to the ICSID convention in Article 8 is conditioned by the 
proviso: “in case the Convention applies”, not “where it (i.e., the Convention) 
applies”. The verb used in the Arabic text of Article 8 translated “shall” as “tatim” in 
Arabic “does not contain the mandatory effect eventually attributed to “shall” in the 
English language”.20 This led the judge to conclude that “Article 8 does not contain 
standing offer to submit ipso facto any investment disputes to ICSID arbitration.”21 
Judge Dr El Mahdi emphasised that the state’s consent to submit itself to the 
ICSID jurisdiction is not to be presumed and but must be proven. In his opinion, 
“the claimants did not present evidence to the effect that Egypt consented in a 
clear unequivocal language to submit the present dispute to the jurisdiction of the 
Centre”.22 
The dissenting opinion and the arguments provided therein raise questions 
about the legacy of the rules of interpretation applied in SPP v. Egypt case. In the 
context of further developments of the case law of international tribunals and 
academic position on the issue, the interpretation standard of the tribunal applied in 
the SPP v. Egypt case in comparison with further developments in case law does 
not raise many doubts about its legacy. 
Some academics argue that tribunals in such cases should distinguish 
between the existence and the scope of the consent to arbitrate, on one hand, and 
the validity or enforceability of the obligation to resort to international arbitration 
                                           
18 Ibid., para 117. 
19 Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd (SPP) v. Arab Republic of Egypt case, Decision on 
Jurisdiction II, supra note 8, Dissenting opinion, 3 ICSID Rep. 112, para 12. 
20 Ibid., para 24. 
21 Ibid., para 24. 
22 Ibid., para 31. 
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contained in municipal investment law, on the other. One has to determine whether 
there is an international obligation under domestic law, and only then can that 
obligation be treated as an obligation governed by international law.23 However, the 
leading position is that “being a unilateral act under international law, such a 
foreign investment law has to be examined in light of the canons of interpretation 
to be found in international law.”24 
For the purpose of establishing whether there is consent to arbitration 
provided in national legislation, in international practice the arbitral tribunals 
usually use the methodological mix of the rules of interpretation involving treaty 
interpretation, statutory interpretation and general principles of contract law. 
Consequently, tribunals use various sources of the interpretation: national statutory 
rules, principles of customary international law, Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT) provisions, references to practice of ICJ and other international 
tribunals. 
Firstly, as concerns the scope of applicability of national law in determining 
the consent to arbitration, the majority of arbitral tribunals, as the tribunal in SPP 
v. Egypt case, rejected purely national methods of statutory interpretation. 
Tribunals recognise the sui generis nature of consent to arbitration in national 
legislation and consider it as unilateral act that must be interpreted according to the 
ICSID Convention itself and the rules of international law governing unilateral 
declarations of states. 
However, the practice of a tribunal still varies in its emphasis on domestic or 
international law. For example, in the Zhinvali v Georgia case a tribunal found that 
interpretation of state’s consent was primarily governed by the law of Georgia, 
subject, however, to the control of international law. 25 In the Mobil and CEMEX 
cases tribunals took the view that when the consent of the State is contained in 
national law. The interpretation of such a unilateral act is governed by international 
law, but, in order to interpret the state’s intent, domestic laws should also be taken 
into account.26 In those cases tribunals put a strong emphasis on the intention of 
the State making the declaration and stated that ‘the intention of the declaring 
State must prevail’.27 The tribunals decided that “intention can be deduced from the 
                                           
23 Todd Weiler, ed., Investment Treaty Arbitration and International Law, Vol. 2 (JurisNet LLC, 2009), p. 
125. 
24 Yulia Andreeva, supra note 3: 59–83. 
25 Zhinvali Development Ltd v. Georgia, supra note 2, 10 ICSID Rep. 3, para 337. 
26 CEMEX Caracas Investment v. Venezuela, supra note 2, para 89; Mobil Corporation v. Venezuela, 
supra note 2, para 96. 
27 CEMEX Caracas Investment v. Venezuela, supra note 2, para. 87. 
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text, but also from the context, the circumstances of its preparation and the 
purposes intended to be served”.28 
Secondly, it is recognised that the rules of the interpretation of unilateral 
declarations are not identical with that established for the interpretation of treaties 
by VCLT. However, most tribunals admit that the ICSID Convention may apply 
analogously to the extent compatible with the sui generis character of the unilateral 
acceptance of the court’s jurisdiction. This approach results in an adoption of a 
good faith interpretation in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms in their context and in light of the act's object and purpose, as it is stated 
on Article 31(1) of the VCLT. In addition, VCLT may be useful “to assess the 
intentions of the author of a unilateral act” by taking into account all the 
circumstances in which the act occurred”.29 
Thirdly, the tribunals also refer to the case law of both the PCIJ and ICJ on 
the interpretation of optional declarations of compulsory jurisdiction of the court 
made under Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute. The tribunals recall in particular the 
rule that a unilateral declaration “must be interpreted as it stands, having regard to 
the words actually used”.30 Tribunals also refer to the rule that due consideration 
should be paid to the intention of the state having formulated such acts, which can 
be deduced from the “context” of the act, “the circumstances of its preparation” 
and the “purposes intended to be served”.31 
When in 2006 the International Law Commission adopted Guiding Principles 
applicable to unilateral declarations of states capable of creating legal obligations, 
with commentaries thereto, international tribunals explicitly or implicitly refer to 
those guidelines as an additional source of interpretation, too. The main rules under 
the Guiding Principles that may be relevant are the following. 
The Guiding principle 7 emphasizes the importance of textual analysis of 
unilateral declaration and declares that it “entails obligations for the formulating 
State only if it is stated in clear and specific terms”.32 The Guiding Principles require 
that weight be given to the “context and circumstances” in which the unilateral act 
was formulated and says that it is necessary to take account all the factual 
circumstances in which the declaration was made and “of the reactions to which 
they gave rise”.33 
                                           
28 Mobil Corporation v. Venezuela, supra note 2, para 90, 94-95; CEMEX Caracas Investment v. 
Venezuela, supra note 2, para 87. 
29 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali), Judgment [1986] ICJ Rep. 554, para. 40. 
30 Mobil Corporation v. Venezuela, supra note 2, para 92. 
31 Ibid., para 94. 
32 Guiding Principles Applicable to Unilateral Declarations of States Capable of Creating Legal Obligations, 
supra note 4, para. 7. 
33 Ibid. 
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Eventually, the Guiding Principles say that in case of doubt unilateral 
declarations must be interpreted in a restrictive manner. This rule, as many other 
rules in Guiding Principles, was inspired by the judgments of ICJ, in particular the 
Nuclear Tests cases.34 
It should be noted that the rule of restrictive interpretation has been identified 
by some academics as a “departure from the approach of the Vienna Convention to 
interpretation”.35 Therefore, it is contestable whether the rule of restrictive 
interpretation may be applied to the state’s consent to arbitration provided in 
national legislation. It is necessary to take into consideration not only the state’s 
expression of consent to arbitration, but also “the foreign investor’s viewpoint – i.e. 
how the foreign investor could understand the consent to arbitration expressed by 
the host State”.36 
The position of the arbitration tribunals on how consent to arbitration should 
be interpreted: restrictively or expansively also varies. For example, the arbitral 
tribunal in the SOABI v. Senegal case emphasised the need to take into account 
investors’ legitimate expectations37. In the Tradex v. Albania case the tribunal 
applied the doctrine of effective interpretation or so called extensive interpretation, 
recognizing that in the case of doubt national law should rather be interpreted in 
favour of investor protection and in favour of ICSID jurisdiction.38 However, most 
tribunals in recent decisions have applied a balanced approach to the interpretation 
of consent to arbitration that rejects both a presumption against or in favour of 
jurisdiction and take “neither broad nor restrictive approach”.39 The same position 
was admitted in the SPP v. Egypt case as well. 
CONCLUSION 
The interpretation standard of the tribunal applied in the  SPP v. Egypt case in 
comparison with further developments in case law does not raise many doubts 
about its legacy. The rules of interpretation of domestic law clauses that grant 
jurisdiction to ICSID arbitration are conditioned by the sui generis nature of consent 
to arbitration as unilateral declarations capable of giving rise to international legal 
obligations. 
The applicable law to consent to arbitration provided in national legislation 
involves not only general principles of statutory interpretation, but also relevant 
                                           
34 Nuclear Tests cases (Australia v. France; New Zealand v. France), ICJ Rep 1974 267-8 (Merits) 
[1974], paras 44, 47. 
35 David Caron, supra note 3: 34. 
36 Marco Steingruber, supra note 7, p. 237. 
37 SOABI v. Senegal, ICSID Case No. Allli/82/1, Award (February 25, 1988), para. 4.10. 
38 Tradex Hellas (Greece) v. Republic of Albania, supra note 2, para. 194. 
39 Mobil Corporation v. Venezuela, supra note 2, paras 112–119; CEMEX Caracas Investment v. 
Venezuela, supra note 2, paras 104–115. 
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rules of treaty interpretation and principles of international law applicable to 
unilateral declarations. 
For the purpose of establishing whether there is consent to arbitration 
provided in national legislation, international tribunals take a balanced approach 
and use the methodological mix of rules of interpretation involving various sources: 
the VCLT, customary law principles governing unilateral declarations and domestic 
legislation. The Guiding Principles acts may be a helpful guide in interpreting the 
state’s consent to arbitration provided in national legislation. Taking into account 
the specific nature of domestic provisions containing an offer to arbitrate before 
ICSID and the need to take into consideration the legitimate expectations of the 
investors, a rule of restrictive interpretation in cases of doubt should not be 
applicable. 
ANNEXTURE 
The request for arbitration was based on Article 8 of Egypt’s Law No. 43 of 
1974 Concerning the Investment of Arab and Foreign Funds and the Free Zone. 
An English translation of the text of Article 8 is provided in Decision on 
Jurisdiction II, para. 71. The translation reads: 
Investment disputes in respect of the implementation of the provisions of this 
Law shall be settled in a manner to be agreed upon with the investor, or within 
the framework of the agreements in force between the Arab Republic of Egypt 
and the investor’s home country, or within the framework of the Convention for 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between the State and nationals of other 
countries to which Egypt has adhered by virtue of Law No. 90 of 1971, where it 
(i.e., the Convention) applies. 
Disputes may be settled through arbitration. An Arbitration Board shall be 
constituted, comprising a member on behalf of each disputing party and a third 
member acting as chairman to be jointly named by the two said members.  
Failing agreement on the nomination of the third member within thirty days of 
the appointment of the second member, the chairman shall be chosen, at the 
request of either party, by the Supreme Council of Judicial Bodies from among 
counsellors of the judiciary in the Arab Republic of Egypt. 
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